THE BURDEN-SHARING ISSUES IN U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS:
A Perspective from Japan

Susumu Awanohara
THE EAST-WEST CENTER is a public, nonprofit educational institution established in Hawaii in 1960 by the United States Congress with a mandate "to promote better relations and understanding among the nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States through cooperative study, training, and research."

Some 2,000 research fellows, graduate students and professionals in business and government each year work with the Center's international staff on major Asia-Pacific issues relating to population, economic and trade policies, resources and development, the environment, culture and communication, and international relations. Since 1960, more than 25,000 men and women from the region have participated in the Center's cooperative programs.

Principal funding for the Center comes from the U.S. Congress. Support also comes from more than 20 Asian and Pacific governments, as well as private agencies and corporations. The Center has an international board of governors. President Victor Hao Li came to the Center in 1981 after serving as Shelton Professor of International Legal Studies at Stanford University.
Occasional Paper 2

**THE BURDEN-SHARING ISSUES IN U.S.–JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS:**
A Perspective from Japan

Susumu Awanoohara
FOREWORD

This occasional paper by Dr. Susumu Awanohara explores security "burden-sharing," one dimension of the U.S.-Japan relationship. In the 1970s and 1980s, burden-sharing became an important issue in U.S. security relations with all major allies, but in Japan's case, it had special characteristics. Because of Japan's outstanding economic performance and large trade surplus with the United States, the public and political pressures in the United State for Japan to assume a "fairer" share of collective defense burdens were intense. On the other hand, Japan's defense environment was very different from that of the European NATO allies in ways that discouraged a greater Japanese military effort. Japanese regarded the Soviet threat as less compelling than did the Western Europeans, and the military's role in pre-war politics and the World War II experience generated strong domestic passivist sentiment. The deep reservations of Japan's neighbors about a large Japanese military force and security role are another important consideration.

These pressures have tended to move the U.S.-Japan burden-sharing discussions in the direction of specializing the contributions each makes to collective security. On the military side, Japan is assuming more responsibility for its own conventional defense and in supporting U.S. troops in Japan. However, as Dr. Awanohara points out in this paper, Japan's efforts are concentrated on trying to receive credit for its foreign economic assistance program, now the world's largest, and its fledgling efforts in international peacekeeping and diplomacy.

Whether these forms of burden-sharing will be appreciated in the United States remains a question. Some Americans ask whether Japan's foreign assistance programs are a "burden" or a means of promoting Japan's own economic interests. Others accept the nonmilitary contributions, but argue that Japan should bear an equal proportion of the costs. The combination of Japan's defense expenditures, support for U.S. forces in Japan, and foreign assistance as a portion of Japan's Gross National Product will still be only a fraction of anticipated U.S. expenditures for defense and foreign aid in the foreseeable future, even if there is some peace dividend from the reduction of U.S.-Soviet tensions.

Burden-sharing is thus likely to continue to be an issue in U.S.-Japan relations despite a reduction in security threats to the alliance. The burden-sharing debate also reflects the continuing uncertainty in both societies about their individual and mutual future security needs and the respective roles that each should play in a new international order. Dr. Awanohara ends his paper with a strong call for Japan to establish its national priorities in today's international context.
This paper is the second occasional paper written by Dr. Awanohara during his 1988–1989 fellowship at the East-West Center. It was originally written as a background paper for a project on "The United States and Japan: Cooperative Leadership for Peace and Global Prosperity" cosponsored by the Atlantic Council and the Japan Center for International Exchange. A shorter version is being published by the Atlantic Council along with other background papers for that project.

The author is indebted to Dorothy Villasenor, who typed the manuscript, and to Patricia Wilson for her editorial suggestions.

Charles E. Morrison
Coordinator, International Relations Program
INTRODUCTION

With Japan's emergence as an economic superpower, the burning question now is what international roles will Japan play in the future. There is already broad agreement that Japan has important economic contributions to make and its recent attempts to play a greater political role have largely been accepted by the international community as natural, given Japan's economic position.

Opinion is sharply divided, however, on whether Japan should also take on a greater security role outside of its territorial boundaries. On the one hand, the United States, cognizant of its own relative economic decline and Japan's rise and increasingly impatient with Japan's continuing defense free ride (or cheap ride as more Americans would characterize the problem today), has intensified pressure on Tokyo to increase its burden sharing in the security of the two countries as well as of their allies and friends. On the other hand, Asians generally are still not keen to see Japan play a major political role, having suffered greatly the last time the Japanese offered their political/security leadership in the region. Many are loathe to let Japan play a military role.

Taking the U.S. defense umbrella for granted, the Japanese (until recently) had found it convenient to be disqualified as a political or military power and concentrate on economic growth, an endeavour at which they proved more adept than most had imagined possible. For a long time, the Japanese had limited their regional/international role to the economic sphere, while engaging in a low-posture reactive diplomacy and a security policy based on self-defense only. This attitude is no longer tenable.

There is today a desire among American and Japanese leaders to see a voluntary and harmonious sharing of responsibility for the security not
only of the two countries, but also of the developing Asian region as a whole. For the time being, Asian countries, particularly those in Japan's proximity, are likely to reject Japan's playing a positive regional or international military role on their behalf. Thus military burden sharing will remain mostly a bilateral U.S.-Japan issue, irrelevant in the discussion of how the two powers should cooperate with the developing Asian region. However, Japan may still be able to play a security role, in the region and internationally, if security is interpreted widely to have economic and political, as well as military, dimensions. Through its economic and political efforts, Japan may enhance the security of developing countries and, hence, of the Western alliance, of which it now wants to become a more active member.

This paper is an attempt to examine the state of U.S.-Japan security burden sharing and explore whether and how Japan and the United States can work out a burden-sharing formula that is reasonably satisfying to both parties and helps—or at least does not threaten—developing countries.

As Japan has accumulated surpluses, the United States in recent years has intensified its demand for greater Japanese burden sharing. The recent thaw in superpower relations has so far had little moderating influence on Americans in this regard. Although the United States today is more determined to get a positive response from the Japanese, there is no U.S. consensus as to what specific shape Japan's burden sharing should take. Until, recently the United States has generally taken what might be called a straight buildup approach, demanding—harshly or gently—that Japan increase its military capabilities and increase U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. More recently, a "division of labor" approach that sees the importance of nonmilitary aspects of security and allows Japan to contribute more in those areas has gained strength.

Seeing that their passive and noncommittal diplomatic/security stance no longer suffices, the Japanese have been rethinking their positions. As a result, a new pattern has emerged in the continuing national debate on security. Although postwar pacifism remains a latent and potent check against contrary forces, it lost its fervor some time ago and gave way to a more pragmatic approach to national defense. For a while political realism was predominant. This meant accepting the need for Japan's military capabilities within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security treaty but still relying heavily on U.S. protection and minimizing Japan's own defense outlays. But recent years have seen the rise of military realism in which view Japan faces real military problems that must be countered militarily, irrespective of popular sentiments and political constraints.

Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone epitomized the rise of military realism and pushed Japan forward toward becoming a major conventional military power. Under him many of the traditional, self-imposed
constraints on defense were either removed or relaxed. These constraints included the 1 percent of GNP ceiling on defense expenditure, the ban on the export of weapons and defense technology, and the denial of collective security. But while the current defense doctrine is deviating from reality, a new direction has not yet been indicated.

Specific areas of burden sharing have been agreed upon over the years. In each area, the United States has made known its expectations, and Japan has complied satisfactorily or otherwise. In each, there are outstanding issues and problems.

In the area of Japan’s own defense, for example, the major debate is over what will follow the current mid-term buildup plan that ends with fiscal year (FY) 1990. In the area of Japanese support for U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ), one question is whether the Japanese can increase their support without attempting to change existing laws. Sharing military technology has emerged as the most intractable area of cooperation, or bitter competition, as the controversy over Japan’s next-generation support aircraft (FSX) demonstrated. In the area of peacekeeping efforts, Tokyo’s decision to send uniformed personnel in addition to civilians on peacekeeping missions can divide the country and outrage some of its neighbors. Japan is likely to become more active politically in the international arena, but this may not always please the United States. The consensus seems to be emerging that economic aid is an area where Japan can contribute significantly to security. But given that Japanese aid has other objectives and effects, conceptual difficulties remain as to what sort of aid would enhance security and for whom, and to what extent Tokyo should make security the objective of its aid.

It is safe to predict that U.S. policy toward Japan will be some mix of the straight buildup and the division of labor approaches, with one or the other being stressed at any given time. Japan will move between political realism and military realism. This paper assesses what factors—domestic, bilateral, regional, and international—may influence the United States and Japan to emphasize the two respective options open to each.

Because both the United States and Japan are likely to move between two positions, four combinations of U.S. and Japanese options are possible. Two of these combinations are stable in the sense that the United States and Japan agree on whether Japan should emphasize aid or a military buildup. In these cases, the outcomes would be a clear acceleration or deceleration of Japan’s defense buildup. In the two other combinations, there is disagreement between the United States and Japan, and the outcomes will favor one country at the expense of the other or, more likely, leave both parties dissatisfied and resentful.

From the point of view of Japan’s neighbors, which generally would like Japan to restrain its defense buildup and stay close to the United States
and would by implication like the United States to maintain its presence in the region, few of the probable combinations are attractive. Not only is Japan's military buildup feared, but also are U.S.-Japan disagreements on security matters, particularly where Japan is more eager for a defense buildup. The Asian neighbors would favor a division of labor approach rather than the straight buildup approach being adopted by the United States, and Japan's choosing the option of political realism rather than military realism. They can be expected to try to encourage these choices by the two powers. Examination of regional responses suggests that this indeed has been happening.

There is a pressing need for some rethinking by the Japanese, on defense, aid, and national priorities. First, Japan is now a major military power whose capabilities can be directed not only at the Soviet Union but also at others. But Japan's current defense doctrine does not acknowledge this reality. Therefore Japan needs to establish a new doctrine and let that be known widely. Second, a coherent philosophy of economic aid needs to be elaborated to clarify what Japan intends to achieve with its assistance and how this relates to the "strategic aid" the United States is demanding from Japan as part of its security burden sharing. Finally, attempts should be made to formulate Japan's national priorities. This presupposes debate and consensus building on Japan's national identity and international role. Because of the lack of a broad national agreement on such issues these tasks are complex, but as a major power Japan is obliged to make a statement.

**U.S. PRESSURE: FROM STRAIGHT BUILDUP TO DIVISION OF LABOR**

U.S. pressure on its allies, including Japan, to accept greater burdens of common defense is not new. What is different is the dramatic shift in the background against which the bargaining is taking place. The alliances, including the U.S.-Japanese one, were created at a time when the United States was overwhelmingly the richer and stronger partner. Today the United States and Japan are the world's biggest debtor and creditor nations, respectively. Boosted U.S. defense spending and a surge in imports coming from Japan and other East Asian economies are major causes of this shift. Many Americans have asked why the United States should continue to defend Japan, or more pointedly, why Americans risk their lives to secure the passage of oil in the Persian Gulf, much of it destined for Japan, when the Japanese are not helping themselves.

A 1988 House Armed Services Committee interim report on burden sharing reflects this frustration. Burden sharing "has taken on a new and heightened importance within the American public and by policy makers
in Washington," the report said. "Many Americans feel that we are competing 100 percent militarily with the Soviets and 100 percent economically with our defense allies. Some have said that the United States has incurred all the burdens of empire and few, if any, of the benefits." In 1989, Congress urged the President to seek full cost-sharing for the USFJ.

The Americans seem determined not to let the Japanese get off easily this time. But there is a dilemma. On the one hand, there is a growing feeling in Washington that in the past the United States was too sensitive to supposedly unique Japanese sensibilities traceable to the last world war, in which Japan caused a great deal of suffering in much of Asia and became the first victim of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Americans are realizing how much of Asia still resents Japanese militarism. Fear of resurgent Japanese military prowess is also extant in the United States itself.

In a broad sense U.S. burden-sharing demands on Japan started in the days of the U.S. occupation of Japan and have continued with greater or lesser intensity to this day. After having disarmed Japan and helped it adopt the peace constitution of 1947, Washington soon afterwards reversed its policy and prodded Japan to rebuild its defense capability. The global cold war and the Korean War (1950–53) reinforced this reversal.

During President Nixon's administration, the Japanese felt the burden-sharing pressure strongly. The idea of burden sharing was implicit in Nixon's Guam Doctrine of 1969, in which he called on friendly countries to assume the principal burden of their own conventional defense. The pressure was obviously related to the economic difficulties the United States was facing at the time. In the mid-1960s, Japan had begun to accumulate trade surpluses with the United States. Rising tensions were epitomized in the textiles dispute of 1969–71. In August 1971, the United States announced the end of the dollar-gold convertibility and the imposition (temporary) of an import surtax.

While Tokyo has tried hard to separate bilateral defense issues from trade issues, and Washington officials have agreed to this in principle, the link was inevitably made on the U.S. side, particularly among the politicians. It is understandable that in trying to win trade concessions Americans are tempted to remind the Japanese of defense commitments. Moreover, when the United States is suffering large trade deficits with Japan, it is not surprising that the Americans want Japan to buy more U.S. defense equipment. This is reinforced by the view that the Japanese gain in trade competitiveness because of their free ride in defense. Trade and defense issues have also been combined when the United States has limited imports of Japanese products for national security reasons. As Japan continues to make major strides in dual-use technology, it will become increasingly difficult to separate trade and defense issues.
Burden-sharing demands became strident during the Carter and early Reagan administrations. At a time when the United States was facing difficulties in Nicaragua and Iran, and the Soviet Union was making strategic inroads into Vietnam and Afghanistan, escalating trade problems helped to fuel the feeling in the United States that Japan was not making sufficient defense efforts. The Americans justified some spectacular ‘‘Japan bashing’’ on the grounds that the Japanese would not respond otherwise. Washington demanded specific, often quantitative, commitments from Tokyo on its defense buildup. Congress shared and amplified this approach. In 1981, Senator Jesse Helms proposed a renegotiation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty to make it a reciprocal arrangement, while Congressman Stephen Neal called on Japan to share in the burden by paying 2 percent of GNP as a ‘‘security tax’’ to the United States.¹

The U.S. vehemence reflected in part a choice of tactic. It was also a result of the fact that Japan was indeed going slow in achieving its stated buildup targets. The Japanese government and even the mainstream of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) reacted negatively to the U.S. approach, which they saw as unilateral and highhanded, enlisting pacifism to ward off Washington’s pressures. This was the period when the Japanese worked out the concept of comprehensive security, in which security was not limited to the military, but encompassed broader political and economic factors. This concept was not well received in Washington, because it was seen as another Japanese smokescreen to rationalize defense inertia and self-serving foreign economic activity.²

Soon after Reagan began his first term in office in 1981, the U.S. approach changed. Quiet pressure on Japan to achieve mutually agreed specific roles and missions was considered more appropriate and effective. Japan’s acceptance of added defense responsibilities, such as the 1,000-mile sealane defense, and commitments to fulfill them may have contributed to the softening of the U.S. approach. The positive attitude toward defense taken by Prime Minister Nakasone, who took office in late 1982, considerably eased the bilateral strain in this area.

But mounting economic tension soon affected the defense area. A turning point came in 1985 when the United States assumed the position of the world’s biggest debtor nation. The Plaza Accord of that year reduced the value of the dollar, but despite the dollar’s sharp fall, the U.S. trade deficit continued to escalate in 1986 and 1987. In 1987, relations were exacerbated by the Toshiba affair, in which a subsidiary of a Japanese manufacturing giant was caught illegally exporting to the Soviet Union technology that allowed the USSR to manufacture quieter submarine propeller blades.

Also in 1987, the Japanese failure to respond to the American call to jointly police the Persian Gulf to ensure a safe passage for oil tankers
added to the ill-feeling and raised further doubts about Japan’s commitment to the alliance. Yet another exchange over whether the Japanese should buy its next-generation support aircraft (FSX) from the United States or build it themselves developed into a major altercation. Though the two sides compromised by agreeing on codevelopment of the FSX, the issue was carried over into the Bush administration and was settled only after considerable damage had been done to the bilateral relationship.

While there is a whole spectrum of opinion within Congress and the administration, Congress generally has wanted Japan to stop making excuses and boost its defense buildup, and the administration is more ready to acknowledge Japanese defense efforts and to be more open to allowing Japan to contribute to security in nonmilitary ways.

Among the bills reflecting the position of Congress is a nonbinding resolution passed in June 1987 (House Resolution #1777) that called on Japan to spend at least 3 percent of its GNP on defense. More recently, the interim report of the House Armed Services Committee on burden sharing stated that “Japan’s defense contributions and capabilities are inadequate given its tremendous economic strength.” Interestingly, the report also showed an understanding of domestic Japanese constraints and sympathized with the Asian fear of a major Japanese military buildup. The report said that the “Japanese can, should, and must do more in defense as well as other security-related areas,” clearly accepting the validity of non-military contributions. While Congressional pressures may originate from a few specific individuals and lack direct policy significance, they should be noted as they reflect and influence public opinion.

In contrast, the administration has taken the position that Japan does more than it is often given credit for in the military area and should not be pushed beyond reason. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, in a statement to the Senate in March 1988, articulated this position. He criticized Congressional Resolution #1777 calling for a 3 percent defense spending by Japan instead of the current 1 percent. “What would the additional funds be used for? A nuclear capability? Offensive projection forces? Some [critics of Japan’s defense free ride] speak of carrier task forces and long-range missiles. . . . Is that what Congress wants? Would that enhance stability in East Asia?”

Still more cautionary views are heard from, among others, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who, in a Foreign Affairs article coauthored with another former Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, warned against pressing Japan to step up defense efforts. “Japan has the right to determine its appropriate security requirements. The United States can have no interest in urging Japan to go beyond that;” the article said, adding that such a course would only generate doubts all over Asia and may “deflect Japan from a greater economic contribution to international sta-
In other writings, Kissinger sounded more ominous: "As Japan’s military capacity grows, and as America emphasizes burden sharing, the price Tokyo is prepared to pay for U.S. military protection is bound to decline!" Here Japan’s quest for autonomous defense, dreaded in East Asia, is clearly implied.

Mike Mochizuki of the University of Southern California has identified four U.S. schools of thought concerning its Far East policy and the alliance with Japan. Two propose extreme options and therefore lack policy significance. By emphasizing the relative decline of U.S. economic power, the first school argues for an American military disengagement from East Asia and the assumption of primary responsibility for regional security by Japan. The other view rejects the notion of American decline and supports a continued U.S. military buildup to meet global commitments without added reliance on burden sharing by allies.

The remaining two views are more in the mainstream, both advocating closer security cooperation across the Pacific but with different emphases. The straight buildup approach seeks an accelerated Japanese military effort and greater U.S.-Japanese cooperation in a joint deterrence strategy. Those critical of American pressures on Japan to increase its defense capabilities point to Japanese domestic political constraints and resistance from other Asian nations and take what Mochizuki calls a division of labor approach to security cooperation. While the United States will continue to provide most of the military requirements of regional security, Japan should share the burden by continuing to expand nonmilitary contributions, notably foreign aid.

Another formulation is that within the mainstream there are two strands, demanding specific and diffuse reciprocities, respectively. Americans wanting Japanese defense burden sharing have generally demanded a Japanese contribution of commensurate or fair value in return for the U.S. contribution. The general American reluctance to accept Japanese aid as a contribution to Western security reflects a specific reciprocity approach. Edward Olsen has made the radical suggestion that American and Japanese commitment to each other must be strictly equal. In his view, "If . . . Tokyo elects not to commit Japan to the defense of the United States, then Washington ought automatically to match Tokyo’s stance by proposing to rescind its defense of Japan. If Tokyo elects not to help defend U.S. interests throughout the world, then Washington should reciprocate by proposing to retract existing protection of Japanese interests in Indian Ocean-Southeast Asian SLOCs [sea-lines of communications], the Middle East and Asia . . . ."

Armitage has articulated the more diffuse reciprocity concept, in which what is commensurate or fair is less strictly defined and reciprocity is based on broadly shared norms of obligation. "Greater, untied, and strategically-
targeted Japanese aid programs would . . . have an immensely beneficial impact on both regional and global stability.\textsuperscript{12}

After a movement toward balance, the U.S.-Japan trade gap is widening again in Japan's favor, which could galvanize the straight buildup/specific reciprocity school in Washington. But the division of labor/diffuse reciprocity camp has also gained new conviction that the United States should not push Japan too hard. The Reagan administration was surprised by the vehemence of opposition to a Japanese military buildup, expressed by both President Suharto of Indonesia and President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines when they visited Washington in close succession in late 1982.\textsuperscript{3} The Chinese have also expressed serious concern over U.S. pressures on Japan to build its defense capabilities. The FSX controversy has driven home the point that Japan's growing defense industry is increasingly ambitious—a trend which may be eased by encouraging Japan to make nonmilitary contributions toward security.

In all likelihood the Bush administration will, like the Reagan administration before it, "[encourage] Japan both to continue the steady progress it is making in its defense efforts, and to build upon its strategically oriented economic aid program," while laying emphasis on either the straight buildup or the division of labor approaches. In a later section, factors likely to determine which approach will dominate are examined, as well as how each of the two approaches will mesh with conceivable Japanese approaches to security.

**JAPANESE RESPONSE: THE RISE OF MILITARY REALISM**

For historical reasons, the Japanese have generally not tried to conceptualize precisely what a fair and just defense burden would be in light of potential threats and the stakes the two allies have in the security of Japan and the region. Rather they have started with the American demands, taking them as more or less reasonable or anyway immutable, and tried to reconcile them with domestic constraints, often using the latter to drive a bargain with the Americans.

Even so, Japanese attitudes toward defense have undergone a significant change over time. The fervent pacifism of the early postwar period gradually gave way to what Mochizuki termed political realism, which acknowledged the need for building Japan's military capabilities within the framework of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. However, it still relies heavily on U.S. protection and attempts to minimize Japan's own defense outlays.

Thus the main battle is no longer between the progressives and conservatives of the preceding decade or two. Those who had been considered conservatives (or hawks or realists) in the earlier period won the battle
against the progressives (or doves or idealists). The Japanese public basic­

ally acknowledged that an external threat to Japan existed and that self-
defense was necessary. Consequently, the Self-Defense Forces and Japan’s
security treaty with the United States were accorded more legitimacy. But
Japan continued to stave off U.S. pressures toward greater burden sharing
on the ground that it was “a nation of peace.”

By the late 1970s, this attitude was being challenged by military real­

ism, which held that irrespective of the popular sentiments and political
constraints, Japan faced real military problems that must be countered
militarily. With the emergence of military realists, the political realists ap­

peared more dovish. The two realisms competed for ascendancy and are
likely to continue to do so.*

In many ways, “political realism” is a new name for what others have
variously referred to as the Yoshida School or the Yoshida Doctrine, after
the eminent postwar Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, or simply the con­
servative mainstream. Yoshida argued in the early postwar years that Japan
should align itself with the United States, relying on the U.S. defense um­

brella and the vast American market. While supporting the development
of the Self-Defense Forces to supplement American efforts, he strongly
resisted U.S. pressures for a major rearmament, citing Japan’s weak econ­

omy, the war-renouncing Article 9 of the peace constitution, Japanese aver­
sion to the military, and a regional reaction from Japan’s neighbors.

Unlike the political realists, the military realists assess the military en­

vironment and then develop a strategy to meet the most likely military
threat. The military realists do not restrict their policy recommendations
to those which would fall within the domestic political constraints against
a major defense buildup. They develop war scenarios and work out what
capabilities Japan needs to deny or repel enemy (Soviet) attacks. The mili­
tary realists are convinced that Japan needs a major buildup of conven­
tional forces and greater cooperation with U.S. forces. The loss of clear
U.S. military superiority after the Vietnam war and the Soviet buildup in
the Far East were crucially important in the rise of military realism.

Aside from the political and military realists, Mochizuki identifies two
other groups on the left and right, the unarmed neutralists and the Japanese

*But obviously even political and military realisms, are only approximations—
ideal types extracted after extensive study of Japanese opinions on defense. There
are no organizations calling themselves by these names and, within their realms,
the two realisms contain diverse elements that could be classified further into sub­
categories. As always in these exercises, some opinion formers are difficult to clas­

sify into one group or the other, and many change positions over time as external
circumstances or they themselves change. Despite all this, the categories are ac­
cepted, sometimes grudgingly, by many principals in the Japanese defense debate—
one strong indication of their analytical utility.
gaullists. While these groups are opposites in many ways, they share a desire for autonomy in contrast to the political and military realists' commitment to an alliance with the United States. The unarmed neutralists of the left have, ironically, come to champion the pacifist constitution handed down by the Americans. They do not believe that Japan faces a military threat from the Soviet Union and oppose moves to revise the constitution or any of the other self-imposed restraints on Japan's defense. In this they have not been very successful.

The gaullists on the right not only fear the Soviets, but also doubt the U.S. commitment to Japan, and therefore promote eventual independent defense. They have clamored to remove Japan's self-imposed constraints on defense policy such as the 1 percent of GNP defense spending limit, the ban on weapons exports, the three nonnuclear principles, and, above all, the constitution that denies Japan the right to make war. Some so-called gaullists abhor this terminology, arguing they are pro-American and not in favor of the nuclear option.

Professor Yonosuke Nagai, now at Aoyama Gakuin University, has added an interesting refinement to Mochizuki's classification of ideas on defense. He posited two important tradeoffs faced by Japan—between opposite "objectives" (on the vertical axis) and opposite "means" (on the horizontal axis.) The opposite objectives are alliance and autonomy (or security and independence), and the opposite means are "welfare" and "warfare" (or butter and guns). Mochizuki's four schools of thought can be plotted thus:

```
wealth (butter)           warfare (guns)
    welfare                 military realism
    political realism       
    unarmed neutralism     
    autonomy (independence)
    gaullism
```

Obviously there is no one correct way of classifying and schematizing ideas on defense, and Nagai's scheme has been criticized. One complaint is that the welfare-warfare axis represents a mere semantic game and is blatantly value-loaded. This complaint may be dealt with by replacing
welfare-warfare with economic-military or comprehensive security-military capability.

One virtue of Nagai’s diagram is that it highlights some of the groups’ complex structural relationships that are missed in a simple one-dimensional spectrum, such as the affinity between unarmed neutralists and gaullists who are both against alliance and in favor of autonomy. Another virtue is that one can plot various political actors on the diagram rather precisely according to where one believes these actors fall within each quadrant relative to other actors. Nagai does this in one of his studies, as reproduced below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Warfare</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(political realism)</td>
<td>(military realism)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x cons. mainstream</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x bus. mainstream</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x MoF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x EPA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x MITI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x Foreign Ministry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x JDA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x LDP right wing</td>
<td>x DSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x Komei Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>x LDP right wing (fringe)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x JSP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x JDA fringe (esp. GSDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x JCP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(gaullism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(unarmed neutralism)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The conservative mainstream and the zaikai (big business) mainstream are both in the top left box (political realism), as are the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Economic Planning Agency (EPA). The right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) are in the top right box (military realism), along with the Foreign Ministry and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). Some Liberal Democratic Party rightwingers and Japan Defense Agency hawks are in the bottom right box (gaullism), and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Komei Party, and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) are in the bottom left (unarmed neutralism). One can quibble with Nagai’s plotting of the diagram (it has been pointed out, for example, that the Japan Communist Party is for armed neutrality, that many Japan Defense Agency officials are political realists, and that the Foreign Ministry falls nearer the vertical axis in the top right box), but these criticisms presuppose the diagram’s analytical utility.

Finally, the diagram allows ordered speculation on how the four schools of thought might align themselves. Will political realists join with military realists to strengthen the alliance with the United States and face the unarmed neutralists and gaullists, who may or may not work together? Or will it be a vertical alignment of political realists and unarmed neutralists against military realists and gaullists?

As Mochizuki and Nagai predicted, political and military realists have struggled with each other since the late 1970s. The military realists have accused the political realists of hiding behind domestic constraints, while the political realists criticize the military realists for ignoring nonmilitary factors of security, placing too much emphasis on the potential enemy’s capabilities and not enough on its intentions, and seeking guns rather than butter. The political realists also warned the Americans that there were hidden gaullists among the military realists, whose pro-Americanism was mere expediency. But given their penchant for the straight buildup approach until recently, the Americans generally welcomed the rise of military realism, with only minor concerns over the Japanese impulse toward autonomous defense.

Yasuhiro Nakasone’s accession to power in 1982 epitomized the rise of military realism. Nakasone managed not to alienate political realists and drew them closer to the military realists. The “Ron-Yasu” era indeed brought a qualitative change in the bilateral relationship; this was the era of new emphasis on respective defense roles and missions.

Political realism is by no means dead. There is a feeling among both the unarmed neutralists and the political realists that Japan has moved too quickly toward a defense buildup and become too deeply involved with U.S. global strategy, often overcompensating for troubles in the bilateral trade relations. Such concerns may potentially influence Tokyo’s policy more.
Barring major unforeseen internal or external shocks, Japanese defense policy is likely to continue to move between political and military realism, interacting with American policy whose emphasis will shift between the straight buildup and the division of labor approaches. A new national impulse in Japan to develop and produce weapons has been stimulated and will feed into the defense debate matrix. This impulse has long been harbored by the defense establishment, which is a loose conglomeration of the Self-Defense Forces, defense industry, and some conservative politicians and government officials. New awareness that Japan now possesses technologies with military application and that the United States may be suspicious or jealous has fueled Japanese technonationalism. This could conceivably boost the position of the gaullists.

### JAPAN REMOVES CONSTRAINTS

Even before Nakasone became prime minister, the Japanese were accelerating their defense buildup in compliance with U.S. demands. Nakasone further increased the pace. Thus, the Japanese have made numerous significant modifications to their basic diplomatic and defense stances. As a result, Japan today is more clearly committed to the United States and the West, and is more willing to contemplate the use of force to cope with threats. While policymakers in Washington welcome this as a Japanese contribution to mutual security interests, a significant number of Japanese are worried about the implications of these changes. There is also concern about the way in which these changes were made—in piecemeal fashion, without serious debate or an explicit change in defense doctrine.

In foreign affairs, the change from a policy of *zenhoi heiwa gaiko* (omnidirectional peaceful diplomacy)—one of Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda's favorite slogans during his 1976–78 tenure—to a policy more clearly committed to the Western alliance came gradually over some years. Like the principle of *seikei bunri* (separating politics from economics) before it; and the concept of *sogo anzen hosho* (comprehensive security) after it, omnidirectional diplomacy reflected Japan's desire to do business with all nations, even while maintaining an alliance with the United States, and avoid taking positions on sensitive political issues. After annoying Washington with his ambiguous position on the U.S. hostages in Teheran, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (1978–80) clearly sided with the United States and the West in joining in the condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In an unprecedented move, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki (1980–82) publicly referred to the United States as an ally, even though he later tried to downplay the military aspect of the alliance, to the amazement and chagrin of Americans.
Prime Minister Nakasone (1982–87) dispelled U.S. doubts by confirming that the United States was indeed Japan's ally and security partner in the Western sense of the words. Through force of conviction, he overcame political objections to this step in Japan. Nakasone took a further significant step in identifying Japan with the West at the Williamsburg summit of industrial democracies in 1983 when he expressed support for the deployment of the U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INFs) in Europe, a support which helped demonstrate the West's political unity behind the U.S. policy of countering Soviet SS-20 missiles. This was the first time in postwar history that a Japanese prime minister had taken such a strong stand on a strategic question. At the 1987 Venice summit, Nakasone also supported the U.S. position that Washington retains the right to deploy 100 INF warheads in Alaska in response to Moscow's insistence on retaining 100 SS-20 warheads in Soviet Asia. This U.S. position is believed to have produced the global zero INF agreement between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.20

A return to omnidirectional diplomacy is highly unlikely barring a significant realignment among the major powers. Nor are the Japanese clinging to seikei bunri. Gorbachev clearly feels that this concept would serve the Soviet Union well, but Tokyo officials, who once used it, despite U.S. protests, to justify trade with China before Tokyo-Beijing relations were normalized, are refusing to apply it to the Soviets. However, the Japanese feel that comprehensive security is still a valid and useful concept, although some policymakers feel the concept as defined by Ohira needs to be reviewed in light of new conditions.

In the area of defense, the changes of position have come more swiftly. Nakasone was associated with many of them. The Japanese have redefined their defense perimeter, relaxed the ban on the export of militarily relevant technology by making an exception for the United States, and breached the 1 percent of GNP ceiling on defense spending. Japan's adherence to the three nonnuclear principles, too, appears less categorical than before. There have also been moves that some believe could lead eventually to the relaxation of Japan's prohibitions against the exercise of collective defense and the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces for overseas peacekeeping activities. The revision or replacement of the National Defense Program Outline, containing Japan's defense-only security doctrine, is being proposed.

Redrawing of the Defense Perimeter

In 1981, Nakasone's predecessor Suzuki declared that Japan would expand its defense perimeters to cover sea-lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles. Earlier the Japanese government had already taken the position that the country's right of self-defense was not necessarily confined to the geographic
scope of Japanese territorial land, sea, and airspace, but the new limit was not made clear. Whereas in 1969 the government said that the right of self-defense extended to "surrounding" open sea and air, in later statements this vague delimitation was withdrawn, although the government declared that the defense perimeter did not extend to the territory of other countries. Suzuki's pronouncement for the first time put a concrete figure on Japan's defense perimeter. It is debatable whether 1,000 nautical miles is sufficient from a strategic point of view, but Japan's neighbors felt that it was considerable distance. On encountering this reaction, the Japanese pledged that the distance was from Tokyo Bay, not from anywhere on the main Japanese islands.

Apart from sea-lanes defense, the government's eagerness to acquire an offshore air defense capability with the backing of such new weaponry as over-the-horizon radar and Aegis (the guided-missile destroyer weapons system), its decision in 1982 to include midair refueling facilities in purchasing the F-15 fighters (whereas it had excluded such facilities in purchasing the F-4 fighters in 1968), and Nakasone's statement in 1987 that it would not be unconstitutional for Tokyo to send minesweepers to the Persian Gulf (although in the end he decided against such a move on political grounds) are all seen as manifesting a tendency to redefine and expand the area to which Japan's right of self-defense applies.

Relaxation of the Arms Export Ban

"The three principles on arms export" of 1967 had banned arms exports to communist countries, those under United Nations sanctions, and those that are at war or likely to become involved in one. A stricter guideline in 1976 practically banned all arms and military technology export. In 1983, Nakasone reversed direction by partially lifting the ban on the export of weapons and military technology by legalizing defense technology transfers to the United States. In justifying the new move, Nakasone's Chief Cabinet Secretary, Masaharu Gotoda, said that Japan had benefitted from the transfer of U.S. defense technologies in building up its defense capability, and that given the recent advance of technology in Japan, "it has become extremely important for Japan to reciprocate..." The relaxation of the ban permitted subsequent Japanese decisions to participate in Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research and to develop the FSX support fighter jointly with America.

Breach of the 1 Percent of GNP Ceiling on Defense Spending

Arguably the least significant in substance but symbolically the most important among the Japanese defense constraints, this limit was breached only after a great deal of debate. The unarmed neutralists and many polit-
ical realists had wanted to keep the 1 percent limit, but the military realists and the gaullists stressed that the limit had no meaning.

The 1 percent limit had been set in 1976, a week after the unveiling of Japan's first coherent defense doctrine, the National Defense Program Outline, which did not address the question of cost. During the 10 years in which it was effective, the 1 percent limit became the battle line between those who wanted a more rapid Japanese buildup (and the removal of limit) and those who desired a slower or no buildup (and the preservation of the limit). The Americans supported the former group while Asians generally supported the latter group.

Nakasone made a frontal attack to break through this limit in the summer of 1985, when he tried to have it nullified explicitly. Resistance was great and included opposition from his seniors within the Liberal Democratic Party who belonged to the conservative mainstream. Although this attempt failed, Nakasone was able to ensure in a more indirect way that the limit would be breached in the near future when he pushed through the Diet the Mid-Term Defense Program (for FY 1986-1990), with a total budget of yen 18.4 trillion in 1985 prices. It was clear that given the slow GNP growth rates prevailing, the annual defense budget would exceed 1 percent of GNP some time during the five years of the program. The 1 percent limit was broken by a small margin in the FY 1987 budget and was officially removed, although the government stated it would "continue to respect the spirit of the 1976 Cabinet decision which called for moderate defense buildup efforts."*24

**Erosion of the Nonnuclear Principles**

The three nonnuclear principles prohibiting the production, possession, and introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons has been cited by Tokyo as proof of Japan's love of peace. Tokyo insists that there has been no change in its commitment to the nonnuclear principles. Some doubt this.

A former U.S. ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer, jolted the Japanese public in 1981 when he stated in an interview that U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons had regularly made port calls in Japan. The Japanese government said it was convinced that Reischauer was wrong, since the Americans had never asked for prior consultations required should they have wished to bring in nuclear weapons.

Whatever the truth of Reischauer's statement, the controversy highlighted the difficulty of relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence while upholding an antinuclear stance. A similar difficulty arose when Nakasone confirmed in 1985 that American command, control, communications, and intelligence installations located in Japan were integrally linked to the U.S. strategic nuclear command and control system, and that this was necessary to enhance the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence for Japan's defense.*25

Since popular antinuclear sentiment is still potent and could conceivably be exploited against Tokyo, not least by the Soviets, the government clearly does not want a national debate on these principles. Confronted by New Zealand’s antinuclear position, the Americans are not about to force the issue of whether or not Japan on principle ought to allow introduction of nuclear weapons. While the public is skeptical that the non-nuclear principles are being adhered to, it does not appear to be overly agitated by this. One reason may be that more Japanese have come to believe that a U.S. nuclear umbrella is necessary.

**Toward Collective Defense**

Japan has voluntarily denied itself the right of collective defense, that is, the right to use force to help stop an armed assault on a foreign country with which it has close relations. It accords itself only the right to self-defense. This makes the U.S.-Japan security treaty a nonreciprocal arrangement in which the United States would defend Japan if the latter is attacked but not vice versa. Various groups in Japan and the United States, for varying reasons, would like a more reciprocal arrangement, but currently it would be extremely difficult to legitimize collective defense in Japan.

The implication of some of Nakasone’s statements, such as the security of the West is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis, conflicts with the denial of the right of collective defense. In 1983, the government took the position in the Diet that the Self-Defense Forces could come to the aid of U.S. naval vessels on the high seas if these vessels were engaged in operations directly related to Japan’s security. Here, Japanese support for U.S. ships was still being justified as an act of individual self-defense, not of collective self-defense. Earlier debates had acknowledged that there were gray areas between individual self-defense and collective self-defense. The government’s 1983 interpretation reduced these gray areas by widening the scope of individual self-defense, rather than openly legitimizing collective self-defense. A joint U.S.-Japan study started in 1982 on “facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces by Japan in the Far East in the case of situations outside Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan,” is likely to contain other extensions to the definition of individual self-defense.

**Toward Using the Self-Defense Forces Overseas**

Japan clearly bans the dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces for the purpose of using force in other countries. After it was severely criticized by some Americans for offering only money and not using personnel for the policing of the Persian Gulf in 1987, Tokyo decided it was time to move a little farther. In 1988, Tokyo dispatched three civilians to join the Unit-
ed Nations' peacekeeping efforts in Afghanistan and in the Iran-Iraq settlement. A larger team of civilians is being sent to Namibia, which is about to gain independence from South Africa, once Cuban troops start withdrawing from Angola. Japan also hopes to play a monitoring role if a Cambodian settlement is achieved.

Whether the involvement of civilians will lead to that of uniformed personnel is a moot point at this time, but there are some among the policy elite who see the dispatch of civilians as a preparatory step, to be followed by doctors and medical personnel from the Self-Defense Forces, and leading eventually to the dispatch of uniformed personnel. There would be a great deal of resistance to any involvement of uniformed Self-Defense Forces personnel, however.

**Revision of the National Defense Program Outline**

Now that the 1 percent of GNP limit has been lifted, the 1976 National Defense Program Outline has become the major bone of contention between many political realists and even some unarmed neutralists on the one hand, who want to keep the Outline intact, and the military realists on the other, who believe the Outline has outlived its usefulness. In a crucial passage, the Outline states that “Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance.” It adds: “In cases where the unassisted repelling of aggression is not feasible... Japan will continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression.” The idea is that Japan must be strong enough to deter attacks up to a certain threshold, after which the United States, for its own strategic reasons, would feel compelled to come to its aid.

The Outline is generally considered Japan’s first postwar defense doctrine. Before the Outline, there existed only in abstract the 1947 constitution, the Basic Policy of National Defense of 1957, and the U.S.-Japan security treaty significantly revised in 1960. There were also for the years 1958-76 the four defense buildup plans that were essentially shopping lists of desired weapons. The Outline for the first time defined the nature of the threat faced by Japan and spelled out ways in which this threat could be faced.

But the document has become increasingly unpopular among the military realists as well as the Americans. It is regarded by critics to have been a rationalization for the then prevailing force levels and an attempt to win domestic public support for defense, and to that extent, useful and justified. But the military realists argue it predated and is incongruous with the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation that accelerated bilateral cooperative efforts; the massive and blatant Soviet buildup of forces in the Far East; and Japan’s new commitment to take on its sea-
lane and offshore air defense. Critics also maintain that the very premise of the Japanese deterring limited and small-scale attacks themselves but relying on Americans for help in bigger attacks is flawed, because the reality in Japan is that the Japanese and U.S. forces will fight together against aggression of any scale. They add that instead of fearing embroilment in a U.S.-Soviet conflict, Japan should make far greater efforts to secure maximum U.S. participation and reinforcement in case of an enemy attack on Japan. The efforts required would exceed those spelled out in the Outline.\textsuperscript{11}

Those who want to preserve the Outline at all costs feel that if it is changed, Japan will be that much closer to the revision of the war-renouncing Article 9 of the peace constitution. Meanwhile, those who criticize the Outline as being outdated and conceptually flawed have not proposed a new defense doctrine for fear that a national debate on defense doctrine would only result in a setback.

\textbf{AREAS OF BURDEN SHARING}

The areas in which U.S.-Japan security burden sharing actually occurs are: (1) Japan's own defense programs; (2) support for the U.S. forces stationed in Japan; (3) cooperation in defense technology; (4) cooperation in peacekeeping efforts; (5) diplomatic cooperation on security issues; and (6) economic aid to strategically important countries.

While a voluntary and harmonious sharing of responsibility is much preferred by the two governments to burden sharing, which results from one manipulating the other, the pattern has been for the United States to state what was expected of Japan in each of these burden sharing areas and for Japan to comply, satisfactorily or otherwise. For each of the six areas, the U.S. demand, the Japanese response, and the outstanding issues and problems are examined.

\textit{Japan's Own Defense and U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation}

Formally Japan's task under the U.S.-Japan security agreement is to defend its homeland and surrounding waters from the Soviet Union and to prevent the use of the three vital straits of Japan by Soviet naval power in times of crises. The United States wants Japan to acquire the capabilities to carry out these basic and other more specific roles and missions. Opinion is divided on whether force levels planned and mutually agreed on in the current Mid-Term Defense Plan are enough to carry out these roles and missions. However, the attainment of force levels specified in the 1976 Outline (and updated in 1981) has been considered an immediate and minimum objective by the Americans. According to Japan's 1988 defense white paper, \textit{The Defense of Japan 1988}, Outline levels will be attained in most areas except in the Maritime Self-Defense Force and Air Self-
Defense Force combat aircraft, which will be 20 units short by the end of FY 1990.

What sort of buildup is envisaged beyond FY 1990? The Americans have publicly discussed this matter. In a typical statement, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Howard Taft, has said: "Japan has the power to enhance its own security significantly. The anti-submarine aircraft, naval vessels, and interceptor aircraft the Japan Defense Agency is now acquiring make it far more difficult for the Soviets to plan operations approaching Japanese territory. Acquiring longer-range early warning aircraft and surveillance systems, such as an over-the-horizon radar, would extend Japan's security perimeter even farther. Still other measures—hardening Japanese bases and providing greater sustainability for the Self-Defense Forces and upgrading communications between U.S. and Japanese forces—would further deter Soviet aggression." The U.S. administration, however, does not want Japan to obtain more offensive capabilities such as carrier task forces, long-range bombers and missiles, and nuclear weapons.

Unlike the Americans, the Japanese have not been publicly forthcoming. In 1987, Gotoda, Nakasone's chief cabinet secretary, said that "the scope of the defense expenditures for the years after the current mid-term defense program shall be decided anew by the end of the program, under the basic policies of Japan, a peace-loving nation, with the international situations and economic and financial conditions, for instance, taken into account." Any changes are likely to be gradual.

In the area of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978 remains the key document. For the first time it assigned specific roles to the three Self-Defense Forces in cases of armed attack on Japan. The Guidelines touched off a host of joint, classified U.S.-Japan studies of which the first, on joint operations, and a follow-up study on sea-lane defense, were completed in 1984 and 1986, respectively. Other studies, including those on interoperability, the exchange of information, and coordination, are in progress. Critics are concerned about possible conflict between domestic law and the policies that may result from these studies. Another concern is that military needs, not the broader consideration of comprehensive security, will determine the shape of Japan's defense.

The Guidelines have also led to larger, more frequent, and more elaborate joint exercises, including those involving all three forces of the two countries in 1986. The fact that U.S. aircraft based in South Korea have joined some of the recent U.S.-Japan exercises and, incidentally, those based in Okinawa have participated in U.S.-South Korea exercises, has raised fears among some Japanese about the emergence of a tripartite U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance, which the Soviets have referred to as "Eastern NATO."
**Japanese Support for the U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ)**

The Japanese feel they have made major efforts to reduce U.S. costs of maintaining armed forces in Japan, by providing facilities and paying for a growing part of the labor costs. To compensate for the sharp appreciation of the yen in the mid-1970s, the Japanese started a "facilities improvement program" in FY 1979, paying for the reconstruction of old U.S. facilities and the building of new ones.

Similarly, measures were taken to increase the amount of money that Tokyo pays to the Japanese who work for the USFJ. In FY 1978, the Japanese started paying some fringe benefits to these workers, and in FY 1979, the differential, incentive payments that these workers were offered by the Americans above the normal public service wages. More recently, in view of another sharp appreciation of the yen, it was decided in 1987 that Japan would pay up to 50 percent of these workers' *sho-teate* (bonuses and allowances). That figure was raised to 100 percent in 1988. The United States still pays the workers' basic salary.

The Japanese are now paying more than 40 percent of the US$6 billion a year that the Americans spend in Japan to maintain the USFJ. That, according to an often cited figure, comes to about US$45,000 per year per U.S. serviceman stationed, which is higher than in any other country with U.S. bases. While Washington says it appreciates this support (although a 1988 House Armed Services Committee report complained that the figure was exaggerated through imputation of high land costs and various opportunity costs), it wants Tokyo to do even more, such as start paying the workers' basic wages, utilities bills, and costs of maintaining and repairing aircraft and ships. Congress is pressing President Bush to raise the Japanese share to 100 percent.

The Japanese are hesitant to do so. One problem is legal and political. Some Japanese officials say it is difficult for Japan to pay more without revising the existing Status of Forces Agreement. This could spark off a new debate on the sensitive issue of foreign bases in Japan. A series of specific problems illustrate how touchy this issue is. The Americans want pilots of aircraft carriers on port call in Japan to be permitted to engage in landing practice, but Tokyo is having difficulty finding a proper site for this. Tokyo’s plan to comply with the American request for 1,000 units of housing near Yokosuka has also met with stiff local opposition.

Another problem is financial. Any amount paid to Japanese workers employed on U.S. bases will come out of the overall yen 18.4 trillion earmarked for defense for FY 1986–90. As long as the costs of supporting USFJ come from the total defense budget, which cannot be expanded drastically notwithstanding the lifting of the 1 percent limit, competition for physical and financial resources between the USFJ and Self-Defense Forces is inevitable.
Cooperation in Military Technology

Sharing military technology has become the single most contentious area of burden sharing. Serious failure in this area can threaten the U.S.-Japan alliance, as the FSX controversy clearly indicated.

The United States has long wanted the Japanese to make the exchange of military technology a two-way affair. The framework for this was established through a 1983 agreement allowing the Japanese to transfer defense technology to the United States. Two technologies concerning ship conversion and ship building (belonging to Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries) have since been transferred. A third technology relating to surface-to-air missiles and involving the Japan Defense Agency and Toshiba was agreed on, but has been stalled after the Toshiba scandal, in which Toshiba Machine, a subsidiary of the giant Japanese manufacturer, was caught illegally selling sensitive technology to the Soviets. It has been reported that the United States is interested in a number of additional Japanese technologies, including micro-and milli-wave technology, optical electronic engineering, optical fibers, and micro-electronics, but transfer negotiations have not progressed.

In 1986, Tokyo decided that the Japanese private sector could participate in SDI research but, justified or not, many Japanese industrialists were worried about restrictive agreements and potential loss of commercial advantage. Japanese popular science writers warn that the United States may in the future try to restrict the commercialization of widely applied and hence relatively low-cost Japanese civilian technologies just because they have potential military applications.

The Toshiba scandal incited Japan's technonationalism. Although few Japanese disputed that Toshiba Machine was in the wrong, it was felt that there was an ulterior motive for the punishment, which many thought excessive. The scandal was exposed just as the FSX fighter aircraft controversy was growing in 1987. Friction in the defense technology field arose again over the Japanese purchase of the U.S. guided-missile destroyer weapons system known as Aegis. Some of the Congressmen who had criticized Japan for its low defense spending opposed selling this technology to Japan, citing the sensitive defense technology involved or arguing that the United States should force Japan to buy not only the Aegis system but also the hull to put it in.

But the FSX became the most intractable problem of all. Japanese engineers were eager to develop a Japanese aircraft and saw an opportunity in the Self-Defense Forces' next-generation support fighter. In the background was the Japanese defense establishment's growing resentment at what it saw as U.S. attempts to arrest the erosion of its defense technological superiority, restricting technology transfers to Japan, and discouraging Japan from developing its own weapons systems. Growing confidence
in their dual-use technology prompted the Japanese to defy the United States which, of course, wanted Japan to purchase U.S.-manufactured aircraft, arguing that they were superior and cheaper. Their purchase would also help balance bilateral trade and ensure interoperability of the U.S. and Japanese forces.

The compromise solution, joint development, was not satisfying to either party. The fact that the FSX joint-development agreement, reached toward the end of the Reagan Administration, left some crucial details to be worked out later prompted some U.S. Congressmen and even the Bush Administration officials to complain that U.S. trade and industrial interests were about to be sacrificed for diplomatic and strategic ones in the name of a good overall relationship. The U.S. media largely supported the opponents of the agreement. A review of the agreement was thus forced and Tokyo was compelled to make concessions. In Japan, too, the incident fuelled nationalism. Irrespective of the substance of the controversy, the image of the United States unilaterally revoking a government-to-government agreement to get a better deal was particularly damaging to the bilateral relationship. It caused many pro-American Japanese in the political center, who were neither technonationalists nor defense-nationalists, to sympathize with those who were.

Peacekeeping Efforts

Prime Minister Takeshita made Japan’s contribution to peace the “first pillar” of his three-point “International Cooperation Initiative,” thereby possibly opening a new era of Tokyo’s activism in international conflict resolution. As he explained in a speech in 1988, “Japan will adhere to its long-held position of not seeking to be a military power and not playing a military role in the world. However, we recognize that we must contribute to world peace through all other means, and I intend for Japan to participate actively in international efforts to resolve and prevent conflicts.”

In a speech a few weeks earlier, Takeshita had explained that Japan’s contribution to peace was a broad notion consisting of diplomatic efforts to establish a firm foundation for peace, international efforts to prevent conflicts, participation in international efforts for the peaceful settlement of disputes, increased assistance to refugees, and positive contributions for economic reconstruction in war-torn areas.

To support such new efforts and to justify them, the U.N. Bureau of the Foreign Ministry has begun a study to establish how personnel should be recruited, what status and treatment they should be accorded, and whether changes in the domestic legal system would be required. The Japanese have participated in some overseas disaster relief in the postwar period, but never in military operations, not even those of the United Nations. The government has explicitly ruled that although Self-Defense
Forces' participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities would not be unconstitutional, it would be against the law concerning the defense forces.

In enunciating his "contribution to peace," Takeshita cited Japan's cooperation in efforts to help secure safe navigation in the Persian Gulf as one example. In fact, Tokyo's activist approach to peacekeeping efforts represents a restrained response to various foreign and domestic pressures concerning the patrolling of the Gulf. U.S. resentment of Japan's defense free ride mounted once again after the frigate USS Stark was hit by an Iraqi missile in May 1987. The Japanese Foreign Ministry was strongly in favor of some decisive action to show solidarity with the rest of the Western alliance, and in Washington Ambassador Matsunaga promised the Americans Japanese support.

Moreover, Nakasone was eager for Japan to participate in the policing action and argued that sending the Maritime Self-Defense Force's minesweepers to the Gulf would not violate the constitution. He added, however, that this might not be possible from a political point of view. An alternative was to send patrol boats belonging to the Maritime Safety Agency which comes under the Ministry of Transport and is thus strictly speaking nonmilitary. Although these ideas had considerable appeal, they also met with vehement criticism from inside and outside the government. The Ministry of Transport and the Japan Defense Agency were much more cautious than the Foreign Ministry, and many Liberal Democratic Party politicians also hesitated to commit Japan to military action. But the most decisive opposition came from then Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda, a former police official whom many had taken to be a defense hawk. Gotoda demonstrated that the conservative mainstream's pacifism is real, not mere expediency.

The cabinet debated the relative advantages and disadvantages of mobilizing the minesweepers or the patrol boats or simply financing the policing of the Gulf by others. How Southeast Asian countries would react to Japanese naval or quasi-naval vessels passing near them on their way to the Gulf, and whether Japanese ships should or could legally strike back when attacked, were among the topics discussed at the highest levels. Gotoda argued that the situation could get out of control if the Japanese ships were attacked and sustained heavy casualties. He particularly feared a popular jingoistic reaction.

In the end no Japanese ships were sent. The final package of Japanese contributions included the underwriting of an electronic precise navigation system in the Gulf to facilitate safe passage of ships, aid to U.N. peace efforts, new economic aid to strategically important Oman and Jordan, and further financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan. In addition, Japan pledged to use its independent access to both Iran and Iraq to help them find an end to their conflict and to provide economic assistance for their postwar reconstruction.
Some Japanese, including Foreign Ministry personnel felt humiliated by the outcome. They continue to feel that the new Japanese activism on peacekeeping is an insufficient form of sharing international responsibilities.

**Diplomatic Efforts—Political Burden Sharing**

Diplomatic efforts are not an area that the Americans have stressed in recent bilateral talks about security burden sharing. This reflects basic satisfaction on the part of the United States about the fact that Japan has become a more willing alliance partner and that there are few serious differences of view between the two countries on diplomatic issues at the moment. But diplomacy is an area in which the Japanese, for their own reasons, want to become far more active. Eventually dissonances may develop, making mutual accommodation necessary.

Japan has at least two official external faces—one for the United States and the West, and the other for the world at large but directed mainly at the developing world. With the first, Japan wants to appear a committed and occasionally even tough ally. With the second, it wants to project the image of a nation that is low-key but peace loving, considerate, and reliable. It has not been entirely successful in projecting either image. Both the West and the world at large see a third Japanese face—that of a one-dimensional mercantilist nation, which for better or worse shuns abstract principles and lacks a sense of its place and responsibilities either as an alliance partner or as an economic power and member of the international community. The third image is a result of Japan's international economic behavior.

As Tokyo attempts to overcome this third image, it will be pulled in two, sometimes conflicting, directions and will play two roles as occasion demands. The first role is that of a better ally, and the second, a better citizen of the world. Nakasone's declaration that Japan is an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the Western alliance typified the desire to satisfy the first demand and was indeed much applauded in Washington, but greeted with dismay elsewhere. Tokyo's increasingly open support for Israel is another reflection of Japan's attempt to comply with alliance demands and become a better partner.

In contrast, Nakasone and his foreign ministers' lackluster attempts to mediate between Iran and Iraq, and Takeshita's promotion of international cultural exchanges—along with peacekeeping and economic aid, a third "pillar" of his "international cooperation initiative"—are more in line with Japan's attempts to win broader acceptance. The United Nations provides an ideal forum for the Japanese as it seems to be regaining dynamism and prestige, and has wide representation from both the Eastern Bloc
and the Third World, which makes Japanese contributions through it appear more truly public.

It is probably in Japan's interest to maintain the two official faces, despite occasional contradictions, although this will entail some deft footwork to avoid tensions. Becoming a better ally of the United States could alienate nonallies and force Japan to make some tough choices. Japanese policies aimed at the world at large are likely to be more effective if they are seen to be autonomous and unconnected to its senior alliance partner. The United States may not oppose all such policies and may even welcome Japanese success where it suits U.S. interests, but it is unlikely to consider these policies as contributions to U.S.-Japan or Western security burden sharing. Obviously the United States will oppose Japanese policies directed at the wider world if they are seen to conflict with Japan's alliance position. A recent example of this occurred in 1987 when Washington pressured Tokyo to restrain Japanese companies eager to do business with Vietnam.

Another bilateral complication may arise as Japan increasingly demands to share the power, not merely the burden, in maintaining security, while the United States, used to calling all the shots, resists. Japan is already experiencing U.S. resistance to its efforts to increase its influence and voting shares in some multilateral organizations, notably the International Monetary Fund.

**Aid Efforts—Economic Burden Sharing**

Economic aid is a crucial area of U.S.-Japan burden sharing. Reluctant to commit itself to a drastic defense buildup, Japan has argued for Washington's benefit that its aid was in part a contribution to regional and global security (as well as to the welfare of the recipient countries per se). The United States is increasingly agreeing that aid, or more specifically, strategic aid, in some general way compensates for what is considered slow defense buildup. Former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci suggested this when he argued that Japan could expand its economic development aid in addition to building up its defense capabilities and supporting the USFJ. He said: "In contrast to expanding its defense capabilities, Japan faces no constitutional constraints in increasing economic aid to nations whose political and economic health is vital to our collective security."

But there is still a strong feeling in Washington (as there is in Tokyo) that regardless of what Japan does in the aid field, it must independently make efforts in the defense field. That is, aid is not a real substitute for defense. Nor will all Japanese aid be considered a contribution by the Americans. Tokyo officials are aware, for example, that Japan's biggest bilateral aid program—to China—is looked on with suspicion as being largely intended to promote Japanese economic interests to the exclusion
of other countries. This is despite the fact that the Japanese consider their aid to China to be of strategic value to themselves (as part of their Soviet policy), aside from having the articulated objective of improving China's living standards and hence bilateral Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese understand that what would qualify as strategic aid in the American definition of the term is only a small fraction of total Japanese official development assistance (ODA).

Many Americans have proposed that Japan raise its total defense and aid expenditure. There was, for example, a congressional resolution that Japan should raise its total defense and aid contribution to 3 percent of its GNP without specified breakdowns. Other suggestions have come with the breakdowns. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, wanted a 4 percent of GNP contribution to security from Japan, of which 1.5 percent would go to defense and 2.5 percent to strategic aid.46

But such proposals are not taken seriously in Japan. One reason is the awareness that not all Japanese aid will be considered a contribution by the Americans. More fundamentally, in the continuing absence of a solid domestic consensus about the nature of the external threat facing Japan, the need for self-defense, the value of the alliance with the United States, and Japan's responsibility for system maintenance, the Japanese do not readily accept the Western practice, derived from the theory of public/collective goods, of regarding defense expenditure, along with aid, as a contribution. This is further made difficult by the Japanese relinquishment of the right of collective defense. To many Japanese (and other Asians) attaching positive values to Japanese defense buildup and mixing it with economic aid seems strange, even outrageous.47

Turning to the actual record, aid, along with defense, has been a favored item in the Japanese national budget. Tokyo has set a new five-year target to double ODA by 1993 to US$50 billion. Criticisms of Japanese aid persist. These are that it is low as a proportion of GNP, that its grant element is low, that it is excessively concentrated on large-scale infrastructure development and neglects human resource development, that it continues to be tied to Japanese exports despite vaunted "untying" efforts by the government, and that Japan's aid machinery is increasingly inadequate to handle the sums being disbursed. Nevertheless, Japan has been the biggest donor of ODA in Asia since 1977 and is now emerging as first in the world.

Japan responded to American calls for strategic aid since the mid-1960s, when it was pressured to provide aid to Indonesia's newly established pro-Western "New Order" regime. Much of this aid can be considered to have been in Japan's own interest. In the 1980s, Japan channeled aid, under pressure from the United States, to countries in which Japan would not otherwise have taken great interest, such as Turkey, Pakistan,
Jamaica, Sudan, and Somalia, as well as to Thailand and the Philippines, which are of vital importance to Japan and the United States.

A problem may arise if the United States and Japan disagree over the definition of strategic and how to help strategically important recipients. Carlucci highlighted the case of the Philippines as one in which Japanese aid would enhance the security interests of the United States, Japan, and the Philippines itself. Some Japanese aid officials resented the U.S. proposal of a "Mini Marshall Plan", which they felt was unfortunately linked at the time of the proposal with the ongoing U.S.-Philippine bases negotiations. They felt this embossed an American seal on a largely Japanese-financed aid program that was forthcoming anyway, without the new packaging. Now that the bases talks have been concluded, some of the strain has been removed, but the Philippine aid issue has not been resolved, and new U.S.-Philippine talks loom on the post-1991 future of the bases.

The Americans have more or less taken Japan's acceptance of U.S. priorities for granted, with Japan expected to provide the money. There is, however, a contradiction in the United States dictating the direction and content of Japanese aid, when Japan does not participate in the decision making and the United States is unwilling to let it. Thus problems could arise even if both the United States and Japan agree that the Japanese should emphasize aid, not defense buildup, in sharing the security burden—an option which Japan's neighbors favor.

PROBABLE FUTURE OUTCOMES

What forces would cause the United States or Japan to choose a certain option? What combinations of such options in the two countries are possible and what do they imply?

Determinants of Respective Options

The United States is likely to emphasize either division of labor with Japan or Japan's straight buildup, while Japan is likely to tilt toward either political realism or military realism. While a straight buildup and military realism call for Japan's greater military efforts, division of labor and political realism call for more nonmilitary efforts, particularly aid.

There are extreme impulses in both countries: in the United States, the impulse to reassert hegemony or withdraw altogether from Asia; and in Japan, one for unarmed neutrality or independent defense. These impulses will have an influence on what course is chosen and how it is presented, but are not likely to prevail as policy in the near future.

In the case of the United States, who is in the White House or Congress may influence the choice of direction, and in the case of Japan, who
is prime minister. But in both countries, more important than the ideas and personalities of the two leaderships in shaping policies are international circumstances—economic, and political-strategic.

**Economic Factors.** The external position of the U.S. economy will be crucial. If economic difficulties become more serious, particularly if U.S.-Japan bilateral economic imbalances increase and bilateral tension mounts, U.S. demands for reciprocity in trade and for greater Japanese burden sharing are likely to intensify, generally with the emphasis on straight buildup rather than on division of labor, because straight buildup tends to be seen as pure cost to Japan, whereas division of labor could be seen as bringing many benefits, as well as costs, to Japan. Similar emphasis on a straight buildup may result if the Bush Administration resorts to painful tax increases and/or further drastic cuts in defense spending to balance the budget. In raising taxes, Bush will be compelled to convince Congress and taxpayers that he is making sure that U.S. allies are also paying their fair shares for common defense. If the defense spending cuts occur in areas where Japan would be affected, Bush would advise the Japanese to minimize the adverse effects through more or less direct replacement.

Japan, for its part, may move toward military realism when the United States is having economic difficulties and bilateral economic relations are strained because of a desire to placate the United States, since defense spending is more likely to pacify Washington than aid. Other things being equal, tax increases and/or defense spending cuts in the United States—which most educated Japanese consider essential to the health of the world economy—would be welcomed in Japan and might help the position of military realism. Supporters of this would be able to make the case that Japan’s defense buildup was essential, albeit indirectly, to world economic health. As in the past, the hidden gaullists would welcome new U.S. pressures for a Japanese buildup and join forces with the military realists, but with the gaullists’ own ultimate objective of achieving autonomous defense. Even when economic problems are pushing the United States toward a straight buildup, however, it is possible that Japan will insist on political realism lines, promising to make more nonmilitary efforts.

If the U.S. external economic position improves significantly, particularly through relatively painless means including improved U.S. competitiveness and boosted exports, the United States could ease its pressure on Japan generally, and in the area of burden sharing be more inclined to let Japan choose its own method of contribution, notably aid. Other things being equal, division of labor is the more likely option for Washington than a straight buildup when U.S. economic conditions are good. Japan is likely to tend toward political realism, since politically aid is so much
easier for Tokyo to increase than defense spending, and aid outlays generally benefit a far larger number of Japanese businesses.

Political-Strategic Factors. Significant improvement in superpower relations—as exemplified by the INF agreement and talks on strategic arms reduction—may not necessarily lead to a U.S. inclination toward a division of labor vis-à-vis Japan. That is a possibility, but the United States may still want Japan's straight buildup if for economic reasons, it wishes to decrease its own forces more quickly than the improving superpower relations warrant and thus needs Japan to offset this.

U.S. military leaders are waiting to see Gorbachev's actions, rather than listening to his words. If indeed Moscow should reduce its forces in Soviet Asia and Eastern Europe, it is more likely that the United States will adopt a division of labor position toward Japan, once Japan has acquired enough capabilities to fulfill its current roles and missions.

The Japanese are divided on how to respond to the improvement in superpower relations. Unarmed neutralists and some political realists say Japan's buildup is no longer urgent, while military realists and gaullists insist that strategic arms reductions, weakening the U.S. nuclear umbrella covering Japan, makes the latter's conventional buildup essential. It is not clear whether political or military realism will prevail, but the Soviets will have to make major conciliatory moves to soften Japan's attitude toward them. A freeze of Soviet forces or their reduction in Asia, in addition to better superpower relations, should favor political over military realism. A further Soviet peace attempt, particularly if it includes some breakthrough in the intractable territorial issue, would also boost political realism.

If, for example Soviet reforms fail and superpower relations deteriorate significantly, the United States would probably push Japan toward a straight buildup again, with Japan in turn adopting military realism. But if fear of war mounts and there are doubts about U.S. willingness to risk a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets to defend Japan, Japan may veer toward political realism, or even toward unarmed neutralism or gaullism. Such impulses toward autonomy were already noticeable in the early Reagan years when Washington took a particularly hard line against Moscow, but they are not likely to dominate Japanese policy except under extreme circumstances where U.S.-Japan relations have been severely damaged.

Below the superpower level, regional developments, particularly China's attitude and policies, could influence Japan. Because of history, most Japanese are resigned to Asia's fear of their resurgent militarism, but if particularly strident, Asian accusations could give rise to emotional Japanese reactions. There is already considerable irritation in Japan, especially among military realists and gaullists, at China's interference on such matters as the revision of Japanese history textbooks and political
leaders' visits to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine (where the war dead including war criminals are honored), and its hypocrisy in condemning Japan's resurgent militarism while nurturing a nuclear strike capability and exporting weapons to raise hard currency. It is not inconceivable that Japan could choose military over political realism because of a perceived threat from China.

It is also conceivable that as Japan becomes stronger militarily, albeit as a conventional power, and increasingly challenges the United States in the field of military technology, the Americans may shift toward the division of labor approach to slow Japan down. A nationalistic Japanese reaction to this, namely insistence on military realism or even gaullism, cannot be ruled out.

**Combinations**

If it is true that the United States will emphasize either a division of labor or a straight buildup while Japan tilts toward either political or military realism, four basic combinations of U.S. and Japanese attitudes are possible as shown in the diagram below. Japan veering toward autonomy (unarmed neutralism or gaullism) cannot be ruled out, but unarmed neutralists and gaullists are more likely to exert an influence by combining forces with other groups.
Japanese policy emphasis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese policy emphasis</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. aid &gt;&gt; defense</td>
<td>buildup decelerates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. aid &gt; defense</td>
<td>buildup slowed/Japanese resentment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or aid &lt; defense</td>
<td>buildup despite United States/U.S. resentment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. aid &lt; defense</td>
<td>reluctant buildup/Japanese resentment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or aid &gt; defense</td>
<td>aid despite United States/U.S. resentment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. aid &lt;&lt;&lt; defense</td>
<td>buildup accelerates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Combinations 1 and 4, in which the two sides agree as to the relative importance of Japan's military and nonmilitary (aid) efforts, are more probable than combinations 2 and 3, in which the two sides disagree, given Japan's reactive diplomacy. Combinations 2 and 3 cannot be ruled out, however. They could occur, for example, when desire for autonomy is on the rise in Japan. Unarmed neutralism could conceivably regain strength if, for example, U.S.-Japan relations are severely strained or Soviet-Japan relations improve markedly. Recent events have shown that gaullism is being boosted by the rising technonationalism in the Japanese defense establishment. Indeed there is a danger that technonationalism will become the vehicle for aggressive nationalism.

In combinations 1 and 4, there is agreement between the United States and Japan, and Japan's defense buildup will either decelerate or accelerate accordingly. With disagreement on whether to emphasize buildup or aid, combinations 2 and 3 are more unstable as the outcomes are not obvious. Whichever side prevails, the other side will resent it. Resentment may accumulate on both sides if negotiations are bitter and the outcome is not clear-cut.

For some years before Nakasone took over, something like combination 3 obtained with a mix of the two outcomes associated with it. The Japanese reluctantly built up their defense forces, and the Americans thought that the Japanese were using aid as an excuse for not doing enough in the defense area. Combination 4 obtained during much of the Nakasone years, when both sides agreed that the emphasis must be on military rather than nonmilitary efforts.

Takeshita, more clearly than Nakasone, hailed from the conservative mainstream and was expected to be more of a political realist, but neither
he nor his successor, Sousuke Uno, was in office long enough to make a clear choice between political and military realism. If the new leadership decides to shift Tokyo's emphasis from military to political realism, and if President Bush continues to stress a straight buildup, there may be a return to combination 3 of the pre-Nakasone period. There will be more criticism of Japan on the free ride grounds, more halfhearted Japanese buildup, and increased Japanese aid, which the United States will be disinclined to consider as a contribution. If Bush places priority on division of labor over a straight buildup while Japan reverts to political realism, combination 1 will result, with Japan emphasizing aid and its defense buildup experiencing a slowdown.

If, as is probable, military realism continues to be more prominent than political realism in Japan, and if the Bush administration continues to stress a straight buildup, that is, if combination 4 persists, the relatively rapid buildup seen at the height of the "Ron-Yasu" period will continue. Combination 2 will obtain if the United States wants Japan to give precedence to aid and Japan insists on emphasizing its military buildup. This will be a new situation. Resentment could rise on both sides particularly if the U.S. desire for a division of labor is a result not of the improved U.S. external economic position but of a growing apprehension at Japanese military and technological might.

FEARS OF JAPAN'S NEIGHBORS

Japan's neighbors have feared its rearmament and U.S.-Japan disagreements on security matters. To many Asians, the ascendant military realists in Tokyo appear arrogant and aggressive, having abandoned the postwar Japanese contrition and desire to atone. This is natural given the military realists' conviction that military reality surrounding Japan must be assessed and dealt with militarily, abstracted from history and politics. The shrill assertions of the Japanese gaullists are similar in spirit to those of the prewar ultranationalists. Together, the military realists and the gaullists can project the image of a resurgent militarism. In addition, Asian observers fear that Japanese policymakers, the political realists among them, do not realize how powerful Japan has already grown as a conventional military power.

Of the four combinations of U.S. and Japanese options, only the first is desirable from the point of view of Japan's neighbors in East Asia, who want to prevent or at least slow down Japan's military buildup and make sure that the United States restrains Japan. All other combinations have negative implications. An accelerated buildup, combination 4 is frightening to many Asians. Combinations 2 and 3 are also fraught with problems. Asians would probably prefer combination 3, in which the Americans are
pressing for a Japanese military buildup and the Japanese are reluctant, to combination 2, where the Japanese themselves are eager for a buildup but the Americans have misgivings about it. Combinations in which aid is emphasized over defense are better than those where defense takes precedence, but possible Japanese resentment at U.S. restraint would give cause for concern. Along with the outcome for combination 4, the outcome where Japan engages in a military buildup despite U.S. misgivings or opposition (combination 2, aid < defense) must be the most negative for Asians. In the former, Japan at least would be acting within the U.S.-Japan security arrangement, whereas in the latter Japan would be going it alone to some extent.

Late in 1987, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew spoke for much of East Asia when he made Japan’s continued low defense posture and reliance on the U.S.-Japan security treaty a condition for his optimism about the region’s future. He added: “It could be disastrous if the Japanese decided that their economic-security relationship with the U.S. was no longer valid and that they must build up their own defense.” Lee stressed that Japan should play an economic role, relocating industries to the region and importing more from it.

China has become the most vehement opponent of a Japanese buildup. The Chinese used to attack Japan’s resurgent militarism before normalization of diplomatic relations with Tokyo in 1972. For the remainder of the 1970s, the Chinese wanted an alignment of nations against the Soviet Union, and were seemingly not averse to seeing a moderate Japanese buildup against the Soviet threat.

The Sino-Soviet thaw and developments inside Japan produced a clearly different Chinese attitude by the mid-1980s. The Chinese saw that Japan’s GNP was growing very large, and believed that the country was developing its technological prowess while abandoning its defense-only stance. Most disturbingly, the Japanese appeared to be deviating from their pledge at the time of normalization to reflect deeply on history. Furthermore, the Japanese were seen by some Chinese to be abandoning their position that Beijing is the sole legitimate government of China. It is said that Beijing is concerned about Japan’s links, existing and potential, with Taiwan. The Chinese also apparently fear that aside from close Japan-Taiwan economic links, the general Taiwanization of the Taiwan elites (diluting the mainlanders’ dominance) and supposed Taiwanese fondness for Japan could encourage sentiments on the island for independence.

At the popular level, South Koreans harbor much the same suspicion and hostility toward Japan as the Chinese do. The image of a militarily humiliated Japan dominating South Korea economically and becoming once more a major military power evokes strong negative emotions in South Koreans. But, in contrast with the Chinese case, South Korea’s recent eco-
economic performance outshining Japan’s and the fact that both South Korea and Japan are allies of the United States have seemed to moderate South Korean feelings about Japan. Further, South Koreans realize that as a result of their economic and political successes their image and standing in Japan has improved vastly, and this perhaps has mellowed their sentiment.

It is obvious to the South Koreans that their economic relationship with Japan is becoming more equal. Many believe the bilateral trade balance, which has been chronically in favor of Japan and a rallying point of South Korean resentment against the Japanese, will reverse itself in South Korea’s favor before long. In the area of security, South Korea has insisted that since its security is vital to Japan, Japan should help in defense against North Korea—but economically, without arms or men. Japan agrees but prefers to state that its economic aid is purely economic. Though defense cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo is slowly developing, through the exchange of officers and intelligence, the Soviet anxiety over an “Eastern NATO”—a U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance—is premature.

In Southeast Asia, too, suspicion and hostility toward Japan have been attenuated by time and circumstances. Generally the members of ASEAN have come to think that economic ties with Japan are vital to their economies and, hence, to their security, even though many still feel that Japan’s share of the accrued benefits is too great. ASEAN’s fear of China as a potential economic competitor and regional hegemon and its greater familiarity with Japan make it relatively relaxed about Japan’s defense policy.

Although many in ASEAN do not wish Japan to play an explicit regional military role, some experts there see it in supportive security roles. According to a Malaysian specialist, for example, Japan can help increase the resilience of the regional states through aid. It can also seek to sustain a U.S. presence, especially in the Philippines, by supporting and indirectly contributing to a compensation package for the U.S. bases there. Japan should provide security assistance to coastal states to ensure the safety and security of maritime transportation in the region. Finally, Japan should seek to develop regular consultations with the countries in the region on political and security matters. Some ASEAN military leaders have gone further to explore the possibility of obtaining military assistance from Japan. The Indonesians have inquired about Japanese weapons, and the Thais about the Japanese underwriting some of the costs incurred by ASEAN in preventing the expansion of the communist Indochinese states.

Since the Soviet Union has been identified by Japan as the main threat and the justification for a military buildup, Moscow has viewed Japan’s buildup in an entirely negative light. In the past, Moscow’s style was to castigate and intimidate verbally and physically, and stiffen Japanese resolve. Gorbachev’s new diplomacy, however, finally seems to be having
an effect even in the relatively low-priority Moscow-Tokyo relations. In his Krasnoyarsk speech of September 1988, Gorbachev used reason to appeal to Japan. He said: "The Soviet people . . . are worried by the stubborn build up of [Japan's] military potential within the framework of 'burden sharing' with the United States." He then asked why Japan, which has advanced to the status of a "great power" without relying on militarism, should now "discredit this unique experience which is so instructive to the whole of mankind?" Gorbachev went on to propose regional consultations on freezing naval forces and lowering tensions.

How can Japan's neighbors obtain the best results for themselves with respect to Japanese security policy? What leverage do these countries have to pressure Japan to give precedence to political rather than military realism, and the United States to stress division of labor rather than a straight buildup? Moscow could try making some real concessions to soften Japanese attitudes, or raise the level of threat in an effort to drive a wedge between it and the United States. For now, it is proposing regional security through confidence building.

Other neighbors with less leverage will have to decide on how to approach Japan. Since mild protestations may be ignored, firmness, sometimes even a shokku (shock) or two, may be required. A collective appeal, particularly in the case of ASEAN, may also prove effective. Too much pressure could result in many Japanese feeling victimized and self-righteous.

Asian countries have appealed to the United States not to prod Japan to become a major military power. The United States has not reversed its policy, but will consider Asian feelings when urging Japan's military buildup. At the same time as trying to assuage Asian fears, it will demand that Japan itself help in this regard. Asking the United States to adopt a division of labor and not a straight buildup policy, implies that Japan's neighbors must think of ways to win an American military commitment to the region. Most of these countries prefer an American presence to that of another major power (be it the Soviet Union, Japan, or China).

Economically, complying positively with U.S. market opening demands may encourage the United States to maintain its security commitments in the region. These countries might be concerned, however, that the United States would squander the marginal economic gains thus obtained, without setting its economic house in order. Militarily, there is little the regional countries can do to induce Washington to remain in the region. The dilemma is that the more self-sufficient the regional countries become in defense, the more likely is the United States to reduce its presence.

Politically, it is not always easy to tell the United States it is appreciated and wanted in the region. This was tried when Manila elicited ASEAN's open endorsement of the U.S. bases in the Philippines in late 1987, but failed when some heads of government, committed to nonalignment, re-
fused to go on record giving such an endorsement. Similar attempts may be made when the bases negotiations begin again for the period beyond 1991.

THE NEED FOR MORE THOUGHT AND COMMUNICATION

The least threatening combination of options for much of Asia is one in which the United States continues to bear the bulk of the military burden, and Japan contributes in nonmilitary ways. The question remains as to what formula would be desirable from a joint U.S.-Japanese point of view. As Armitage has pointed out, "Governments of free peoples will not sustain any major investment of resources [in common security] unless the benefit to them is well-understood." But coming to such an understanding is a daunting task. Polls show that many Americans regard the U.S.-Japan security relationship as more beneficial to Japan, while the Japanese think the opposite. Within Japan, the variance of opinion on the benefits of burden sharing is still so great that forcing the issue may prove divisive and counterproductive.

Nonetheless, there is an urgent need for Japanese rethinking about defense, aid, and national priorities. Since Japan has become a major military power whose capabilities can theoretically threaten all neighboring countries and Japan's current defense doctrine has been superseded by practice in certain crucial respects, there is a strong argument for reassessing and revising the official defense doctrine. Above all, Japan must make its defense policy transparent. There are many constraints on doing so. Some groups who fear an increased buildup wish to preserve the current doctrine. Meanwhile, some pro-defense groups fear the high political cost of reopening the national debate and doubt the utility of a new doctrine that can never be 100 percent honest or transparent. Nevertheless, Japan's neighbors' "uncertainty and concern that . . . Japan may build up its military capability without a clear strategy and become a military power without knowing what the power is to be used for" must be assuaged.

A debate on aid is also necessary at a time when Tokyo's ODA outlays are increasing rapidly, but there is no consensus on their objectives. Tokyo has explained to the recipients that the objectives of Japanese aid are economic and humanitarian, and to the United States that the aid sometimes has strategic aims and payoffs. However, Japanese officials are quietly resisting radical politicization of aid. Among the Japanese public there is tacit understanding that aid as "cost" or "dues" enhances Japan's national economic, as well as some corporate, interests. Some Japanese are beginning to ask whether Japan, in giving aid, should also not assert more forcefully than in the past how it wishes the recipients to spend it. Some
argue that Japanese aid is crucially lacking an underlying political philosophy, while others say the absence of high-flown idealism is a strength, not a weakness. A new theory of aid, attempting to synthesize the above disparate elements, is called for.

Finally, in order to have a meaningful debate on defense or aid, Japan must attempt to establish its national priorities in today's international context, defining its national character and role in shaping the world, not just how it will react to world events and opinion. Recent developments have made the Japanese more than normally self-conscious, and there is already considerable debate over "whither Japan?" Some political realists maintain that Japan can and should on principle remain a merchant state, resisting a military buildup. There is also the view that by renouncing a military role, Japan has become the hub and inspiration of a new and superior Asian-Pacific civilization. Military realists cite history to debunk such delusions. One military realist argues that Japan can best achieve its objectives of prosperity, freedom, and security for its people by remaining secondary to the United States—a view the gaullists will not accept.

Most of the debate has so far remained internal. Internationalizing it would help the Japanese understand how they are seen by the rest of the world and what it expects of them. It would also inform the world of the evolving Japanese self-images, aspirations, and intentions that are a legitimate concern given Japan's growing power and influence.

The Japanese may find the dialectic cumbersome and frustrating, but it is an essential process if they are to become trusted citizens of the world.
NOTES


4. Interviews with current and former U.S. diplomats who were involved in U.S.-Japan relations during the Carter administration.

5. See note 1, pp. 8-9.


12. See note 6, Armitage.


14. See note 6, Armitage.

15. For the original definitions of political realism and military realism, see Mike Mochizuki, “Japan’s Search for Strategy,” International Security, Volume 8, No. 3, Winter 1983/84, pp. 152-178, and Yonosuke Nagai, Gendai to Senryaku [Modern Times and Strategy], Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1985, particularly the first chapter “Boei ronso no zahyojiku” [Coordinates of the Defense Debate], pp. 9-46. See also note 9, Mochizuki.
16. See note 15, Mochizuki.


21. The Japanese government’s position on the defense perimeter was stated in the Diet on 29 December 1969, 17 April, and 3 October 1981. The first statement said the perimeter was extended to “surrounding open seas and air,” but the others did not. See *Boei Handobukku 63 nen ban* [Defense Handbook, 1988], Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1988, pp. 379-80.

22. Statement of Chief Cabinet Secretary on Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States, Tokyo, 14 January 1983.


26. An *Asahi Shimbun* poll in 1985 showed that 78 percent of the respondents favored the three nonnuclear principles with 10 percent opposing them; 70 percent felt that nuclear weapons were in fact being introduced into Japan, and 10 percent did not; 34 percent believed the U.S. nuclear deterrence was necessary as compared to 29 percent ten years earlier. *Asahi Nenkan*, 1986 [Asahi Yearbook, 1986], Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1986, pp. 306-7.


28. See note 25, Alagappa, p. 27.

29. The expressions “money,” “blood” and “sweat” were actually used by Tokyo policy elites during the Gulf crisis. This is hinted at in, for example, “Kokusai kyoryoku koso no imisuru mono” [The Meaning of the International Cooperation Initiative], an interview with Shoichi Kuriyama, *Sekai no Ugoki* [World Developments], Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 1988.

31. Some of these criticisms against the Outline are found in the recent writings of Seizaburo Sato, "'Naze, soshite donoyona gunjiryoku ka' [Why and What Sort of Military Power Does Japan Need?], Chuo Koron, December 1985, pp. 88-98; Hisahiko Okazaki, "Magarikado ni kita nichibei domei" [Japan-U.S. Alliance at a Crossroads], Bungei Shunju, July 1988, pp. 94-111; and see note 27, Nishihara.


33. See note 6, Armitage.


35. See note 34, Chuma.

36. See for example "Nihon no senzai gunji gijutsu" [Japan's Potential Military Technology], Voice, September 1987, pp. 92-117, in which the technology levels of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union in key defense areas are compared. In this, Japan looks very strong indeed.

37. See note 19, Awanohara.


40. Noboru Takeshita, a speech given at the 15th Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Third Special Session devoted to Disarmament), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 June 1988.


42. Masahatu Gotoda, in his latest book Seiji towa nanika [What is Politics?], Tokyo, Kodansha, 1988, p. 102, writes: "As long as we of the generation which experienced the war are leaders of this country, we will not allow Japan to be embroiled in another war. At the same time it is our responsibility to establish a national framework that will allow Japan to engage wholeheartedly in peaceful diplomacy, so that the next generation, which does not know war, will avoid making mistakes."

43. See note 42, Gotoda, p. 101.

44. 'Japan's Contribution to the Safety of Navigation in the Gulf,' a Japanese cabinet decision, 7 October 1987.


46. Zbigniew Brzezinski, an interview with Masataka Kosaka, Asuteion, Fall 1987, p. 80.
47. For example, at the 1988 annual Trilateral Commission meeting in Tokyo, Isamu Miyazaki, a prominent private-sector economist formerly with the Economic Planning Agency, warned against "an automatic application of [the] argument [that military cooperation constitutes a form of international contribution] to promote further military build up of Japan."

48. See note 45, Carlucci.


50. See, for example, note 3, Olsen, p. 146.

51. See note 25, Alagappa, p. 41.


53. Mikhail Gorbachev, a speech given at Krasnoyarsk, September 1988.

54. See note 1, p. 62.

55. See note 6, Armitage.

56. See, for example, Challenges and Opportunities in United States-Japan Relations, A Report Submitted to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan by the United States-Japan Advisory Commission, September 1984, p. 13.


58. See note 31, Okazaki, p. 103.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Susumu Awanohara is Washington, D.C., Bureau Chief for the Far Eastern Economic Review, a position he has held since June 15, 1989, after a year's sabbatical as Research Fellow at the East-West Center's International Relations Program. Dr. Awanohara holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from Tokyo University and a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University. He joined the Review in 1973 and has served as economics reporter in Hong Kong (1973-74), Tokyo Bureau Chief (1975-78), Singapore Bureau Chief (1979-81), Jakarta Bureau Chief (1981-84), and as Regional Editor based in Hong Kong (1985-April 1988). For the past few years, Dr. Awanohara has specialized in Japan's relations with its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region and in U.S.-Japan relations.